If. execution is not a proper penalty or at least a justifiable penalty for murder, and abortion is not murder, I do not see how it could be argued that abortion clinic bombings, shootings of abortionists, etc. are justified or proper.

If. execution is the proper penalty for, or at least a justifiable reaction to murder, but abortion is not murder, then abortion clinic bombings, shootings of abortionists, etc. are not justified.

If. abortion is murder, but execution is not a proper penalty for or at least a justifiable reaction to murder, then abortion clinic bombings, shootings of abortionists, etc. are not justified.

However.if abortion is murder and execution is the proper penalty for, or at least a justifiable reaction to murder, then abortion clinic bombings, shootings of abortionists, etc. are perfectly justified.

Two objections may be raised to this assertion. I'll deal with the easily refuted one first, most often heard from the mouths of conservatives who both consider abortion murder and consider execution a justifiable penalty for murder: That it is not proper or justifiable to kill abortion-clinic workers etc. because abortion is currently legal. The assumption here is that the law, whether the result of legislative action or of judicial activism, can change whether a thing is moral (acceptable) or not. If the conservative accepts that "the law" can change the moral status of an action, then he must also accept that it renders abortion justifiable, and that it therefore cannot be considered murder. If violence is a justifiable reaction to murder, but not to abortion, then abortion is not murder.

The second one is only slightly more complicated because it conjures up another premise for consideration: That, specifically, bombing abortion clinics and similar methods of violence are illegitimate because those particular actions endanger the lives of innocent bystanders (including fetuses). This objection raises the question of whether or not it is moral to harm innocent bystanders if your ends are just.

Most people would not say it is unjust for Joe Shmoe to have ten million dollars; if it is not unjust for Joe Shmoe to have ten million dollars then it is just. If he is not obligated to value the "rights" of others more than his own inherently just ends one can only conclude that he can acquire ten million dollars in any way he pleases: he is justified in practicing identity fraud, bank robbery, etc. to achieve a perfectly moral end in the swiftest and most efficient manner. Perhaps this reductio ad absurdum is a little too absurd, but I would counter any assertion to that effect that since the very outlook is inherently relativistic, it prevents ends themselves from being defined as 'good' or 'bad', and, more importantly for practical purposes, an individual's intentions can never be reliably discerned, while actions are plainly observable. Therefore to say that it can be moral to intentionally harm innocents in the pursuit of a just end is to eliminate morality from one's worldview altogether, and reduce all ethical analysis to consequentialist equations. That may be all well and good, but it's not relevant to my purpose here.

However, is one responsible for damage to innocent lives one unintentionally causes? If one can reasonably predict that at a given moment, only guilty parties will be in or near an abortion clinic, is one responsible for damage done to an innocent party unexpectedly wandering by at the wrong moment? If one is, then using means against abortion clinic workers that might possibly harm innocents can not be justified, but otherwise, violence against them is perfectly moral.

Conclusion: On purely moral terms, one who holds both that abortion is murder and that lethal violence is a justifiable response to murder cannot but hold that lethal violence against abortionists and clinic workers is justifiable. Such a one may still hold that it is unwise to do so, on consequentialist grounds, but cannot condemn such actions on moral grounds nor support the use of force to against those carrying out such actions.